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Paul Davidson's Rediscovery of Keynes's Finance
Motive and the Liquidity Preference Versus Loanable
Funds Debate
1. Introduction
To be published in P. Arestis (ed), Keynes, Money and
Exchange Rates: Essays inHonourofPaulDavidson, Aldershot:
EdwardElgar.
A paradoxical destiny was suffered by the debates that
followed the publication of The General Theoryin thelate thirties.
Even thoughno one woulddispute that The General Theory wasto
becomeoneofthe mostinfluential booksin the history ofeconomic
thought, the discussions between Keynesandhiscritics that were
meanttoenlightenthe public asto the meaning ofthe novel concepts
and models Keyneswasoffering in that work were largely ignored
and/orforgotten, even by most(at least nominally) Keynesians.1 A
case in point is Keynes’s 1937 paper on “The General Theory of
Employment”, where his approach to uncertainty, as opposed to
calculable risk, was explained and its consequences explored, the
existence of which was never acknlowledged by mainstream
Keynesians.?
Keynes’s debate with Bertil Ohlin in the pages of The
Economic Journal on the determination of interest rates had a
slightly brighter fate, but the attention it has attracted has been far
1. Mainstream Keynesians seem to have neverfelt completely at ease withthe schoollabel. Modigliani, in his debate with monetarists, preferred tobe called “non-monetarist” rather than Keynesian (Modigliani, 1977).Tobin was “proud”to be Keynesian (Tobin, 1987). New Keynesians arenotso sure. As Mankiw putit: “If new Keynesian economicsis nota truerepresentation of Keynes’s views, then so muchthe worst for Keynes”,quoted in Davidson (1994), p. 299,
2. Again, among mainstream Keynesianpalma a Ss, Tobin seemsto be an exception.See Tobin’s interview in Blaug (1990).
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less than one would expectgiven the importance economists have
assignedto its central theme, the determinationofthe interestrate.
In this exchange, Keynes developed the approach presentedin The
General Theory accordingto which the interest rate is determined
bytheinterplay ofthe demandfor and supply ofmoney, while Ohlin
presented his Wicksellian view thatthe interest rate is determined
in the credit market. The opposition between the twotheories had
ultimately to do with their diverging viewsofthe role savings and
investmentplay in each model, and, thus, related directly to the
validity ofKeynes’s principle of effective demand.
In part, this debate fell into oblivion because the dominant
view among macroeconomists, inspired by Hicks, cameto be that
there is no essential difference between the theories. It became
accepted that liquidity preference and loanable funds were not
really contrasting theories but actually complementary approaches
to the determination ofthe interest rate. It was alleged that the
Marshallian framework within which these theories had been
formulated by early macroeconomists prevented them from seeing
that general equilibrium requiredthe joint consideration ofmoney
and credit markets in the determinationofall prices, including the
interestrate.3
Notall economists, however, shared the view that nothing of
substance was being disputed in the liquidity preference versus
loanable funds debate. Thebland phrasingofthe consensus argument
should be replaced by the harsh wordsofthose whoconsideredthis
choice to dependonfundamentalaspects oftheory. ForLeijonhufvud,
for instance:
“Unlike the Cambridge Keynesians, I do not accept the
Liquidity Preference theory of interest ofKeynes’s General Theory
or any of the “lemmas” that flow from it. J believe it to be
3. The complementarity thesis goes back a long way.See, e.g., Lerner
(1947), Modigliani (1944).
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theoretically unsound, empiricallyfalse, andpracticallydangerous.”
(Leijonhufvud, 1981, p. 195, my emphases)#
Paul Davidsonalso consideredthe pointsraised inthe Keynes/
Ohlin debate to be of central importance:
“The Keynesian Revolution was aborted by those who claimed
to be Keynesians but who disregarded Keynes’s Treatise on Money
and his finance motiverevision.” (Davidson, 1994, p. 110)°
The arguments developed by Keynes, Ohlin, Robertson and
others that took part in the debate are atfirst sight, difficult to
evaluate. Most ofthe time theparticipants seem to be talkingat cross
purposes. After reading the wholeset of papers,oneis left with the
impression that the most heated disputes were mostly due to a
mutual lack of understanding as to what each author meant when
creating concepts and advancingtheoretical propositions. Most of
the time, we see an authorindicting his opponentfor notbeing able
to reach conclusionsthat in fact were implied in the way thefirst
discussantdefined a given concept but were foreign to the way his
opponentviewedit. Whenthe discussantsfailto agree,they attribute
the remaining dispute to each other’s faulty logic instead of
acknowledging that they often use the same wordsto refer to very
distinct phenomena.‘Infact, there are atleast three differentthemes
under discussion that the authors allow to get entangled: the
4. Elsewherein the same work, Leijonhufvudstatedthatliquidity preference
was “historically important” because “many of the weaknesses of
“Keynesian economics” really stem from it.” (Leijonhufvud, 1981, p.
134n)
5. Becauseoftheir disregard ofthe finance motive introduced by Keynes
in his debate with Ohlin,“mainstream Keynesians [were encouraged] to
developa bastard Keynesian modelthat wasa perversion ofKeynes’s own
system.” (Davidson, 1994, p. 122)
6 A clear example is Keynes’s and Robertson’s different meaningsattributed to the conceptofliquidity. Both authorsinsistin trying to makeeachotherto admit implicationsthatare foreign to what each ofthem takesliquidity to be, although Keynes, at least seemed to be conscious of
Robertson’s particular use of the term (Keynes, 1973, p. 230).
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macroeconomic roles played by saving and investment; the
determination of the interest rate; the foundation of a financial
theory of capital accumulation,that is, the definition offinancial
preconditions for economic growth (Carvalho, 1994). These are
interrelated but essentiallydiverse issues, the degree ofseparability
between them dependingon whichparticularmacroeconomic theory
is accepted. Besides, the boundaries between a monetary theory of
interest anda credittheory ofinterest maybe obscure when money
is mostly created by banks as a result of supplying credit. This
feature of modern bank-money economies may have led many
economists to assumethat differences between the two theories of
interest became irrelevant in modern times, if they ever were
meaningful.”
Amonghis many important contributions to the development
of macroeconomictheory in a post Keynesian perspective, Paul
Davidson’s rediscovery and interpretation ofthe arguments involved
in the Keynes/Ohlin debatecertainly standout. Carefully separating
the issues involved, Davidson wasable to significantly contribute to
the clarification of the concepts proposedby Keynesand totheir
development.In this paper, we try to identify the most importanct
of these contributions.In section 2, we make a very brief sketch of
the original debate between Keynes and Ohlin, amphasizing the
developmentof concepts and models orignally presented in The
General Theory. Section 3 is then dedicated to a presentation of
Davidson’s interpretation and further exploration of the novel
concepts offered by Keynes and point to new lines of research
inspired by these studies. A summary concludesthe paper.
7. Some Keynesians now adopt loanable funds theory without even
mentioning there may be somecontradiction between this approach and
Keynes’sliquidity preference theory. See, e.g., Blinder (1989).
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2. Keynes’s defence of the liquidity preference theory
of the interest rate
A key element ofKeynes’s macroeconomicsis the rejection
of the assertion that the interest rate’ is the elementthat brings
saving and investment into equality. According to Keynes, there
wasno direct, unambiguousrelation betweenthe act ofsaving and
the interest rate. A distinction was proposed between an agent’s Lime
preference,that explained choices between consumptionand saving,
andhis/herliquiditypreference, that had to do with choicesasto the
form in which wealth should be accumulated. The decision whether
to direct income to immediate consumptionorto putit asidein the
presentto finance an act ofconsumptionin an indefinite date in the
future depended, according to Keynes, mainly on the agent’s
income. The decisionto savein an uncertain world generally obeys
a precautionary motive to reserve some ofone’s present income to
guarantee that consumption standardswill be preserved in the event
ofadverse developments taking place. Savingis notthe placement
of a definite order for future goods, but the demandfor wealthas
such, that can be used if and when the occasion requires it.? An
individual makingthis kind ofchoice naturally turns to liquid forms
of wealth, monetary assets, that mostly represent wealth as such,
8. The interest rate should be understoodas an indexofinterest rates, a
price index, not as any particularrate. In The General Theory modelthere
is only one non-monetary financialasset (bonds). Theinterest rate refers
to this aggregate. Aswill be argued below,ifthis choice as to aggregation
wasuseful in The General Theory to present the principle ofeffectivedemand,its usefulness is much less visible in models that explicitly
acknowledge moredisaggregated choices as to financialassets.9. “An actofindividual saving means- so to speak - a decision not to havedinner today. Butit does not necessitate a decision to have dinneror to buya pair of boots a week henceor to consume any specified thing at anyspecified date. ... Itis not a substitutionoffuture consumption-demandforpresent consumption-demand, - it is a net diminution of such demand.”(Keynes, 1964, p. 210)
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that is, wealth in a general form, as Marx putit.!° To part with the
safety that keeping liquid wealth givesto its possessorit is necessary
to pay him/herfor the risk he/she is going to accept. According to
Keynes,it is here that interest comes to the picture:
“... the rate ofinterest at any time, being the rewardforparting
with liquidity, is a measure of the unwillingness of those who
possess moneyto part with their liquid control overit.” (Keynes,
1964,p. 167)
The interest rate (or the price of securities) is, thus, the
variable that reconciles the demand for liquid assets with their
availability.!!
Keynes wentonto arguethat choices betweenthe various forms of
wealth should be only marginally affected by new incomeflows,
and, therefore, by the flows ofnew savings and investment. Demands
for the available classesofassets wereinfluenced bytheirliquidity
premia, expected returns, carrying costs and expected capital
apreciation (or depreciation). These characteristics attached to the
existing stocks of each givenclassofasset, not just to their newly
available flows. Theinterestrate, therefore, was determinednot by
the needtoallocate the savingflow between money and bonds(the
only non-monetary asset in The General Theory model), but to
allocate the value ofwealth amongtheexisting stocks ofmoney and
bonds. The interest rate shouldbe determinedina stock equilibrium
model, notaflow equilibriummodel. As argued above,it performs
the role ofchanging the price ofthe non-monetary assetin such away
as to induce the wealth-holdersto keepin their portfolio the exiting
stocks of money and bonds."
10. Money becomesa “liquidity time-machine”in Davidson’s expression.
E.g., Davidson (1994), pp. 114 ss.
1]. “It is the ‘price’ which equilibrates the desire to hold wealth in the form
ofcash with the available quantity ofcash.” (Keynes, 1964, p. 167). To put
it another way:“Thefunctionoftherate of interest is to modify the money-
pricesofother capitalassets in such a way as to equalise the attraction of
holding them andofholding cash.” (Keynes, 1937, p. 250).
12. See also Kregel (1985).
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Taking the interest rate to be the reward for parting with
liquidity, and having moneyasthe only liquid asset in The General
Theory, Keynes then analysed the motives to demand money. He
identified three such motives: to pay for planned transactions, to
keep as a precaution against an uncertain future, and to speculate
over the future behaviorof the price of bonds. The transactions
demand was proposedasproportional to income, the speculative
demand dependedonthe expected behavioroftheinterest rate, and
the precautionary demandwas suggested, without much reflection,
also to be proportional to income.!3
Ohlin, in his critical examination of The General Theory,
agreedthatthe interest rate was not determined by investmentand
saving, arguing that Keynes had shownthem to be always equalto
one another, but did not accept that the proposition that it was
explained by the supply and demandfor money. Rather, he argued,
the interest rate is determined by the supply and demandforcredit.
The credit market could be conceivedas gross and net, depending
on whetherone wasconsidering only theflow demand and supply
or the stockdemand and supplyforcredit.!4 The result would,in any
case, be the same (Ohlin, 1937, p. 225). Beit as it may, it was not
the demand and supply ofmoneyas such that counted, but ofcredit,
a larger concept.!5
Keynesrejected Ohlin’s approach, arguingthat allit did was
to reintroduce investment and saving through the back doorto
determinetheinterestrate. In his view, Ohlin defined the supply of
credit in such a wayasto makeit equalto saving and the demandfor
credit as equal to investmentso the credit market would be in
13. A very unfortunate step according to Kahn. See Kahn 1954.14, “What governs the demand and supply of credit? Two ways ofreasoningare possible. Oneis net and deals only with newcredit, and theotheris gross and includes the outstandingold credits.” (Ohlin, 1937, p224, his emphases)
, “1S. “The ‘market’ for cash has no key position in relation to othermarkets.” (Ohlin, 1937, pp. 225/6)
texto para discussao - iei/ufij 9
equilibrium ultimately when investment equaled savings.In fact,
Ohlin accepted Keynes’s equality between investment and saving
as a tautology. In his view, what really mattered was that the
propensity to save and the propensity to invest are different
phenomena. These propensities werethe ultimate determinants of
the supply and demandforcredit and,thus,ofthe interestrate. (e.g.,
Ohlin, 1937b, pp. 426/7)
Although rejecting Ohlin’s approach, Keynes conceded
anyhowthat there was an important qualification to be madeto his
liquidity preference modelrelated to investment. The demandfor
moneyto payfor projected investmentsdid notfit well in any ofthe
three motives to demand moneydescribed in The General T)heory.
Whenaninvestmentplan was decided upon money was demanded
to coverthe interregnum “between the date when the entrepreneur
arranges his finance and the date when heactually makes his
investment” (Keynes, 1937b, p. 665). Althoughit consisted in a
demand for money to buy capital goods, like the transactions
demand,itwas muchlessstable thanthe latter,related to investment
plans adopted becauseofexpectations offuture profits, rather than
to current income. Thefinance motive to demand money,in fact,
applied to discretionary spendingin general, not only to investment
expenditures. Given the less stable nature of these demands, the
finance motive would notsharethe routine character ofthe standard
transactions demand for money. As Davidson would putlater, this
new reason to demand moneyshould be more fruitfully viewed as
a shiftfactor than as one of the endogenousvariablesin a money
demand model (Davidson, 1994, p. 126).!6
The addition ofthe finance motiveto theliquidity preference
modelled Keynesto arguethat an increase in investments above the
16. “Investmentfinancein this sense is, of course, only a special case of
the finance required by any productive process; butsinceit is subject to
fluctuationsofits own, I should ... have done well to have emphasizedit
whenI analysedthe various sources ofthe demandfor money.” (Keynes,
1937a,p. 247)
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customary level would cause, ceteris paribus, the interest rate to
tise, not because of the necessary stimulus to consumersto save
morein orderto financethe investment, but because the demandfor
money wouldrise above the existing supply. The pressure on the
interest rate wasnotto be alleviated by an increase in thrift, but by
an increase in the money supply. As Keynes putit:
“[t]he ex-ante saver has no cash,butit is cash whichthe ex-
ante investor requires ... For finance ... employs no savings.”
(Keynes, 1937b, pp. 665/6)
Itis not, thus, a problem ofabstentionbutofliquidity. Keynes
wentfurther. He arguedthat the problem related to money,not to
income.That the pressure onthe interest rates would take place in
advance ofthe investment expenditure (and therefore of income,
and savings, creation) because money would be taken out of
circulation to pay for the planned purchases whenthe time came.
Whenthe investment wasfinally spent, money would bereleased
makingit possible for thenextinvestor to gethold ofmoneyto spend
it buying capital goodsin a future date (cf. Keynes, 1937a,p. 247).
Iftherate ofinvestment wasconstant,this pool ofmoney would act
as a revolving fund in which the liquidity released by a spender
would now beavailable to be held by another prospective spender.
It was only ifthe rate ofinvestmentwasaccelerating thata liquidity
problem would arise because the money spent by one investor
would beless than what was needed bythe nextinvestorin line.
Ohlin, as Robertson andothers, reacted very negatively to
this line of argument. From this point on, the whole debate got
entangled in a gameof wordsthat meantvery different things for
each ofthe discussants. Robertson took the finance motive to refer
to thesetofliabilities issued by the Prospective investor and arguedthat no one would beliquid by spending the money they borrowedbut by beingable to pay one’s debts. Robertson,thus, took liquidityto mean thatthe balance sheet of the investor (and of banks) is inequilibrium in termsofthe liabilities issued and the assets bought.
Keynesreplied that liquidity was released when spendingtookplace
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because money held in advance of spending was now back into
circulation. Liqudity in this sense has to do with supply and demand
for money. Noneofthe disputingsides to this argument seemedto
recognizethat they were talkingat cross purposes.In fact, underthe
pressureofthe critics, mystified by the use of the term finance to
meanakind ofmoneydemand,instead ofthe more familiar meaning
ofissuingliabilities, Keynes made difference betweenfinance,the
creation ofmoney,andfunding, the posteriorallocation of savings
that permitted investors to improvetheir balance sheetsituation.
Nowfinance and funding had a meaning closer to Robertson’s
concerns,butits relation to the finance motive to demand money
remained unclear, as well as the ideas on the revolving fundandthe
restoration of liquidity through spending, ideas which,in any case,
Keynes refused to recant.
The debate ended ina conceptual mess, more from exhaustion
than from enlightenment. Keynesclearly lost it in the sensethat the
majority of the economists, then and afterwards, seemed unable to
understand his ideas, and retreated to the much more familiar,
classically-rooted, loanable funds model proposed by Ohlin and
Robertson. Mostly, the debate was buried and forgotten by the
mainstream. For those who remained faithful to Keynes, and to
liquidity preference theory, however, importantlessons were to be
learned from Keynes’s attempts to respondto his critics. Among
these, Paul Davidson wascertainly a pioneer.
3. Paul Davidson’s contributions
Loanable funds theorists commemorated Keyne
s’s
identification of a finance motive to demand
money, related to
ment plans, as a retreat from the
view presented in The
General Theory that the intere
st rate was a monetarya
having nothing to do with the i
nterplay between investment and
40. Forsome,although Keynes had
insisted that savingstill ha
»inthsnee onthe determinati
on ofthe interest rate, to acknow
ledge
invest
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that investment wasoneofits determining elements wasa sign that
liquidity preference wastheoretically fragile. The refusal to accept
that savings wasalso oneof the determinantsofthe interest rate
should be explained mostly by Keynes’s idiosyncrasies than by
theoretical rigour.
These theorists may have beenmisled by the use ofthe term
finance to denominate this new motive. The term is suggestive of a
demandforcredit rather than for money and Keynes’s own attempt
to distinguish between finance (but not the finance motive) and
fundinglater in the samedebate mayhavestrengthenedthisintuitive
meaningof the word. These two points, however, should be kept
analytically separated,as we argued above. Onerelates to the need,
in amonetary economy,any buyerhasto get hold ofa given amount
of moneyto beable to acquire goods in advance of the purchase
itself.!? The other hasto do with the relationship between assets and
liabilities in the balance sheet ofthe buyer (andits bank). The central
point of liquidity preference theory as an element of Keynes’s
principleofeffective demandis that althoughthey are two different
(though related) processes, none of them requires a previous
availability ofsavings or even plans by consumers to save in the
future. Accordingto the principle of effective demand, savings
result from investment spending. An investor does not need savings
to buy capital goods, he needs money. Moneyis created by the
monetary authorities or by banks, when creating deposits. To satisfy
the finance demand for money, banks haveto be ready and willing
to create deposits and the monetary authority to create reserves.It
is the policy of the authorities and the liquidity preference ofbanks
themselves that matter. Bankscreate deposits astheyoffercredit, so
the creationoffinanceto trigger the investmentprocess depends on
the liquidity preference of banksas well, the willingnessto issue
17. In this sense,it is a demand for money. To obtain through credit
operations does not changethe fact that someone must be supplying the
buyer the money he needs to makethe purchaseeffective,
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their own(fully) liquid depositliabilities in exchangeforthe less
liquid debts issued bythe prospective investor. Once the investment
is made, incomewill be generated in the capital goods sector and
demandwill spread to the consumption goodssectorto serve the
demandsofthose who producecapital goods.Thisis the multiplier
proposed by Keynesandits end-result is that consumers will have
an additional amountofsavingsin their handsprecisely ofthe same
value of the investmentoriginally made. Ideally, although it is
unlikely that things happen this way, these savings would be used
to fund the investor’s debt, allowing himto settle his short-term debt
with the banksthat offered him financeat the beginning. Keynes’s
meaningofliquidity in this debate referred to banks’ willingness to
satisfy the finance demand for money. Robertson’s concept of
liquidity referred to the possibility of funding the investor’s debt
allowing them to repaytheir debts to the banks. Theseare different
issues, but Keynes’s pointis that savings are the starting point of
neither the money market problem notthe financial one.
Onecould say, then, that the central point opposing liquidity
preference to loanable funds theorists is the role played by the
banking system in modern economies. For Keynes, the banking
system (including the monetary authority)is the creator ofmoney,
and moneyis whatit takes foran investment plan to be implemented.
“This meansthat,in general, the banks hold the key position in the
transition from
a
lowerto ahigherscale ofactivity” (Keynes, 1937b,
p. 668). Loanable funds theorists, in contrast, banks are essentially
intemediaries between savers and investors. Institutional
characteristics, such as the fractional reserve system give banks
somelatitude of choices, but theis functionsare ultimately limited
to transfer real resources from saversto investors in the amountsthe
two groups agree about. As a Consequence, Keynes believed that
interestrates hadto reconcile bankingpolicy withthe preference of
the public for monetary assets. Loanable fundstheorists believe theinterest rate to reconcile the intertemporal preferencesofthe publicwith the technicalpossibilities Open to investors
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These problemswerefirst considered by Paul Davidsonin the
mid-60sand haveconsistently been a concernofhis from then up
to his most recent book. Davidson’sstarting point is precisely the
distinction between the money marketdiscussion andthedistinction
betweenfinance and funding.
Accordingto Davidson,the finance motive allows to connect
the monetary analysis of the Treatise on Moneyto the principle of
effective demand of The General Theory. Davidson criticizes
Keynes for having yielded, in the latter, to mechanistic models of
monetary analysis, when proposing a transactions demand for
moneyby households functionally related to aggregate income.In
the Treatise, in contrast, Keynesrelated the demand for money to
planned expenditures by households and firms, rather than to
equilibrium incomes,giving a behavioralcontenttothe transactions
demandfor moneythat waslost in the mechanistic approach. For
Davidson,the finance motive recuperates the behavioral basis ofthe
transactions demand for money. Money is demandedin advance of
planned spending both of consumption and of investment. What
differentiates them is the alleged routine character of households’
consumptionexpenditures as opposedto the volatility ofinvestment
spending. The finance demand for money, thus, is a kind of
transactions demand,sinceit refers to the needto get hold ofmoney
in advance ofa purchase operation. But while the latter category
would be applied to routine expenditures, assumed to be stably
related to current income, the finance demand should be definedin
terms ofdiscretionary spending,that has no necessaryrelationtoit,
In these terms, the finance demand would explain shifts in the total
demand for money as described by the three motives mentioned in
The General Theory.
Alternatively, one could consider an enlarged transactions
demandfor money function, encompassingboth the finance and the
transactions motives, as Davidson proposesin equation (4) below.
The consideration of the finance motive would illustrate
Keynes’s argumentthatin monetary economies onecannot separate
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real from monetary variables. In fact, while in the traditional
formulationthe transactions demand for moneywould berepresented
by
(1) L=ky
the transaction plus finance demand would consider planned
consumption and investment. Let us assume consumption (C) to be
related to income (Y) and investment(I) to interestrates (i)according
to the following functions(a,b,c,d being parameters)
(2) C=at+bY
(3) l=c-di
Then, the demand for money comprisingboththe transactions
and the finance motive would begiven as:
(4) L=xC + yl =xat+yc+xbY-ydi '8
withx and y being parametersofthe money demandfunction.
As a consequence,if planned investment was to increase, money
demand would also increase and, if this increase was not
accommodated by the banks and the monetary authority, interest
rates would increase. Onthe other hand,if the monetaryauthority
and banksdecided to accommodatethe additional demand, money
would be endogenousandtheinterest rate would stay put.!9
Davidson stressesthree importante features ofthis model. On
e hand,itshows a crucial element ofKeynes’s economics,thatintegration between monetary andrealvariables, in the sense




18. Cf. Davidson (1978), Pp. 160/170.
19. Cf. Davidson (1978), pp. 178/9 and (1994), pp. 128/9.
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money. Secondly,it showsthe conditions in which a crowding out
effect may emergebutit also showsthatthelatter is a consequence
ofa lack ofmoney, nota lack ofsavings.Itis liquidity preference,
notthrift thatis at the root ofthe problem. Finally,it also refines the
analysis of the influences to which the money demand functionis
subject, overcoming the mechanistic approach inspired byits
treatment in The General Theory. The function is sensitive to
changesin expectations(that control investment and consumption
expenditures), income distribution, taxation, etc. An important
corolary is that investment does have someinfluence ontheinterest
rate but this does not meananyovertureto the loanable funds model,
because pressure caused by increasing investments (or increasing
autonomous consumption or public spending for that matter)
concentrates on the demandfor moneyandis alleviated by changes
in the supply of money and not by increasing thrift that do not
necessarily affect either the liquidity preference of banks or the
policy of the monetary authorities.
Asto the distinction between finance and funding, again
Davidson’s point is that what is needed to initiate an investment
processis the availability ofmoney,not ofsavings. Moneyis needed
either because the investor needsto get hold of liquid means of
purchasein advanceofthe act of spending?! or because moneyis
necessary to allow the firms producing capital goodsto buy labor
services and meansofproductiontoattend to the investors’ demand.
20. In one of Davidson’s favorite quotations from Keynes’s works: “The
investment market can becomecongested throughshortageofcash. It can
never becomecongested through shortage of saving. This is the most
fundamental ofmy conclusions withinthisfield.” (Keynes,1937b, p. 669)21. Davidson’s definition ofthe finance motive: “... entrepreneurstypically
hold somecashbalances between paymentsperiods to assure themselves
that when they enter into forward contracts for the purchaseofcapitalgoodsthat will be produced during the period, they will be able to meet
these obligations.” (Davidson,1978,p. 164).
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These arethe roles offinance, as opposedtofunding the short-term
debts generatedin the processofinvestmentthrough the creation of
long-term credit or equivalent(cf. Davidson, 1986).
Financeis supplied when someone retaining liquid assets (or
with the possibility of creating money) accepts to becomeless
liquid, exchanging them forrelatively illiquid assets. Thisis, again,
a question of liquidity preference, not ofthrift. Less obviously,
however, fundingis also basically aquestion ofliquidity preference.
According to Keynes’s principle of effective demand, there will
alwaysbe an aggregate amountofsavings generated in an economy
equal in value to the investments realized, no matter howthrifty
consumers are. Through the multiplier analysis, Keynes showed
that consumerswill eventually hold an amount ofvoluntary savings
in their handsthat is equalto the investment value spent by firms.Problems can neverarise because savings are insufficient, butbecause consumers may decide to keep those savings in formsthat
are incompatible with the funding needsoffirms. In other words,
savers’s liquidity preference may be incompatible with the demands
for long-term credit from firms. Asa result, investors will either
have to becomespeculators in the sense of Minsky, acceptingliabilities that are shorter than their assets,or will have to pay highinterestrates in orderto induce savers to part with liquidity.Davidson discussedthis problem in the context of Kaldor/
Shenae model by Creating a variable to represent theleecerashhofouthiennecda iquidity preference.This variable was
© non-monetary character of those models.
Thereis, in fact, a third way outof that dilemma.It is the
Pasin
22. See Davidson (1978), PP. 299 ss
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4. Concluding Remarks
Paul Davidson has contributed to explore the financial and
monetary theory of investment required by Keynes’sprinciple of
effective demand. He wasable to disentangle the threads of the
Keynesversus Ohlin/Robertson debateofthe late thirties, showing
thatits central issueis the role of liquidity preference andthepolicy
ofthe banking system as opposedtothrift in the determination ofthe
interest rate, defended by Keynes againstthe classical theory. Some
important difficulties remain, however, to be tackled.
Asthe creation of money in modern economiesinvolvesthe
issuance of debt to be bought by banks, the determination of the
interest rate, in fact, as shownin that debate, has to consider three
different models: first, there is determination ofa stock-equilibrium
between the supply and demand for money, opposing those with
various spending plans to the creators of money, banks and the
monetary authority; then we haveto considerthe multiplier, through
which aflow-equilibriumis reachedin the goods market;finally, we
have the question of funding the debts, ir order to achieve a stock-
equilibriumin the financial market and to close the wholecircuit.
Theinteraction between these models cannot be properly
explored, however, within the original terms of the debate. In
particular, whenfinanceand fundingneedsare considered, one can
nolongertalkin term oftheinterest rate. We have now to disaggregate
the credit marketintoits different segments, into which different
agents with different motivations and specific action timing take
part. An important elementto analysetheir operationis preciselythe
changesin the structure of interest rates that take place when an
investmentprocessisinitiated. Keynes began an analysis of this
kindin the Treatise on Money, examiningthe behaviorofshort and
long-term rates of interest and their interrelationships. The
developmentoftheseinsights integrating theminto the generalized
liquidity preference modeloutlined hereis still to be done.
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